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Introduction 
Although the concepts of secularism and the separation of Church and 
State are common features of modern democracies worldwide, differing 
cultural histories have produced diverging views on the extent that the 
freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice should limit the State’s 
ability to impose secularism.  The United States and France are two 
democracies that place equal weight on the importance of the separation of 
Church and State, yet these two nations have vastly different interpretations 
of how secularism should influence the religious practices of their citizens.  
On October 7, 2010, the constitutional authorities1 of France announced 
that the proposed legislation banning face coverings in public places did not 
violate the French Constitution.2  The law bans masks and veils that 
obstruct the face in all public places.  Those wearing face-covering veils 
will be punished with a fine of 150 Euros and a citizenship course, and 
those forcing a face-covering veil upon another will be punished with a year 
in prison or a 15,000 Euro fine.3  While the law does not refer specifically 
to Muslim face covering veils—known in France and throughout the world 
as hijabs, niqabs, burqas, or voiles—it is implied that the Muslim 
community is the primary target of this legislation, as there are few other 
types of face coverings worn in modern French society.  Furthermore, the 
ban has made exceptions for virtually all other types of face coverings worn 
in public such as ski and sanitary masks.4  The ban also does not affect 
other types of Islamic head coverings such as the chador, which covers the 
top of the head and the body, but not the face. 
This ban has sparked worldwide debate and controversy.  While 
several European states approve of the ban, agreeing with the French 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW:  ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND 
METHODOLOGY 29–30 (Michael Kindred trans., Louisiana State University Press 1972) 
(stating that the role of the Constitutional Council is to review all legislation and to ensure 
that it is constitutional);  see also Dominque Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools:  
Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 377–78 (2006) 
(discussing the role of the Constitutional Council as the last barrier to a bill’s legality in 
France). 
 2. See CNN Wire Staff, French Burqa Ban Clears Last Legal Obstacle, CNN, Oct. 7, 
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-07/world/france.burqa.ban_1_french-burqa-ban-ban-last-
year-full-face-veil?_s=PM:WORLD (announcing that the French ban on head coverings did 
not violate the French Constitution or the Declaration of the Rights of Man as incorporated 
into the French Constitution) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. See id. (noting the specificities of the French law). 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the mechanics of the French ban). 
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government that veils are insulting to the dignity of women, many Muslim 
women, as well as many Americans, argue that the law goes too far and 
violates the freedom to exercise one’s religion.5  Opponents of the ban 
argue that the ban forces Muslim women to choose between obeying their 
faith, thereby exposing themselves to fines and public embarrassment, and 
abandoning a practice that is central to many women’s connection to and 
identification with Islam.6  France, as one of the few true secular republics 
in the world, is regarded as having the utmost respect for the dignity and 
liberty of the individual.7  However, with growing unrest in the French 
Muslim community and the resulting radicalization of Islam, France has 
turned to this drastic measure, which, to many Americans, appears 
impermissible.  As Islam continues to be a main feature of the challenges 
facing the Western world today, this recent development in France begs the 
question:  could this happen here? 
This Note will address the constitutionality of a similar hypothetical 
ban in the United States, focusing on the different analytical approaches 
used in arriving at the French ban and in striking down a similar ban in the 
United States.  Part I will discuss the cultural and political significance of 
the veil, as well as its reception in France and in the United States.  Part II 
will point out the similarities between the French and United States 
constitutional provisions implicating the freedom of religion and will 
contrast their application in light of differing views of secularism and social 
norms in the two nations.  Part III will explore the development of Free 
Exercise jurisprudence in the United States and introduce the U.S. Supreme 
Court case law on the Free Exercise Clause as well as the relevant Federal 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See CNN Wire Staff, supra note 2 (“Some eighty-two percent of people polled 
approved of a ban, while 17 percent disapproved.”).  The article continued:   
That was the widest support the Washington-based think tank found in any of 
the five countries it surveyed.  Clear majorities also backed burqa bans in 
Germany, Britain and Spain, while two out of three Americans opposed it . . . . 
Id. 
 6. See e.g. France’s Burqa Ban:  Two Women Fined for Covering Faces, ABC, Sept. 
25, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/frances-burqa-ban-women-fined-covering-
faces/story?id=14591682 (noting that the burqa ban essentially places Muslim women who 
chose to wear a burqa under house arrest because they will be fined if they go out in public 
wearing a burqa) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 7. See Saskya Vandoorne, Burqa Ban Opponent Fined by French Court, CNN, Sept. 
22, 2011, http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/22/france-hands-down-first-burqa-ban-
sentences/ (stating that French authorities argue that the burqa ban upholds French values of 
equality and dignity) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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statutes.  Part IV will apply U.S. case law and follow the analysis most 
likely to be employed in deciding a challenge to the hypothetical 
legislation.  Part V will discuss the likely outcomes of challenges over the 
French ban to the European Court of Justice and to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
I.  Cultural Perceptions of the Islamic Veil 
A.  The Veil as a Religious and Cultural Symbol 
The belief that Muslim women should cover themselves comes 
primarily from the Hadith, a collection of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
teachings.8  The Hadith and the Koran both contain passages that have been 
interpreted to require that a woman should cover herself to prevent men 
from disrespecting her by leering at her bare face and hair; this guards her 
modesty and virtue.9  Different permutations of hijab have evolved to 
include the chador—covering only the head and hair—and the completely 
enveloping burqa. 
Today, the veil continues to be an important symbol among many 
Muslims as “the single most obvious marker of faith—even more 
unambiguous than a beard or a turban—thus a woman who wears hijab is 
often the first choice spokesperson when a community wants to say ‘We are 
serious Muslims.’”10  Although donning the hijab is discussed in the Koran, 
and is therefore a theological element, the seldom recognized, modern 
reality is that religion in a broad sense is no longer at the heart of one’s 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See L. Clarke, Hijab According to the Hadith:  Text and Interpretation, in THE 
MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA:  ISSUES AND DEBATES 214, 232 (Sajida Sultana Alvi, 
Homa Hoodfar & Sheila McDonough eds., 2003) (discussing the purpose of the hijab as laid 
out in the Hadith). 
 9. See THE HOLY QUR’AN 24:31 (Yusuf Ali, trans., 1934) available at 
http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/quran/index.htm [hereinafter QUR’AN] (“And say to the 
believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should 
not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that 
they should draw their khimar over their bosoms and not display their beauty . . . .”);  see 
also QUR’AN 33:59 (“Those who harass believing men and believing women undeservedly, 
bear a calumny and a grievous sin . . . . ”).  “Enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the 
wives of true believers that they should cast their outer garments over their persons:  That is 
most convenient, that they may be distinguished and not be harassed . . . .”  Id. 
 10.  Pamela K. Taylor, I Just Want to Be Me, in THE VEIL:  WOMEN WRITERS ON ITS 
HISTORY, LORE, AND POLITICS 119, 123 (Jennifer Heath ed., The University of California 
Press 2008). 
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decision to wear or not to wear the veil.11  As Islam is increasingly 
politicized worldwide, the veil has taken on new meanings to Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike.12  In addition to identifying the faith or culture of the 
wearer, the veil carries a political message in many Western countries.13 
Even though Muslims and non-Muslims alike have preconceived 
notions about women who choose to wear the veil, the hijab and similar 
face coverings can hold different meanings for different women depending 
on their country of origin, their relationship with Islam, and their desire to 
be affiliated with or not affiliated with a particular political movement.14  
Due to differing views on womanhood and women’s rights, a veiled woman 
could be perceived in the West as oppressed and dominated by men, while 
the woman could be choosing to wear the veil to remind herself that she 
demands respect and behaves in a confident manner.15 
B.  Perceptions of the Veil in France 
High numbers of Muslims in France have led to an ideological gap 
between France and its fellow European states when it comes to acceptance 
and tolerance of Muslims.16  Outward signs of Islam—especially the veil—
have been blamed for France’s modern social problems, including 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Aisha Lee Fox Shaheed, Dress Codes and Modes:  How Islamic is the Veil?, 
in THE VEIL:  WOMEN WRITERS ON ITS HISTORY, LORE, AND POLITICS 290, 293 (Jennifer 
Heath, ed. The University of California Press, 2008) (“Whether Islam requires women to 
cover their heads and/or faces is perhaps less pertinent to women’s lived experiences than 
whether their families, local religious authorities, and governments require them to cover 
themselves.”).  “For this reason, contemporary debates around the veil should begin with 
politics rather than theology. . . .”  Id. 
 12. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 121 (suggesting that September 11, 2001 was a 
turning point for Western perceptions of the veil). 
 13. See id. at 125 (discussing the relationship between the Islamist movement, 
political Islam, and the hijab). 
 14. See id. (“I believe that hijab should mean only what it means to the individual 
wearing it. . . .”);  see also Shaheed, supra note 11, at 293 (referring to women in Central 
Asia who chose to veil purely to identify with Middle Eastern communities following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union). 
 15. See Sigrid Nokel, Islam, Gender and Dialogue:  On Body Politics and Bio-
Politics, in ISLAM AND THE NEW EUROPE:  CONTINUITIES, CHANGES, CONFRONTATIONS 178, 
183 (Sigrid Nokel & Levent Tezcan eds., 2006) (pointing out that, for many Muslim women, 
the veil is not a sign of oppression but a sign of dignity and respect for the wearer). 
 16. See Muslims in Europe:  Country Guide, BBC, Dec. 23, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm (demonstrating France’s higher Muslim 
population compared to other European countries) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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communalism, sexism, and Islamism.17  Islamism in particular is thought to 
pose a threat to the French way of life and the foundational concept of 
secularism.18  Islamism is seen as a danger to French society because it is 
not viewed as a religion but as “a political project to reshape public life 
around Islamic norms.  Because it takes religion out of its proper, private 
domain, Islamism violates French political ideals and social norms.”19  In 
the French view, the preservation of French ideals requires that public 
displays of religion appearing to support Islamism be removed from the 
public sphere.20  Contrary to the true reasons that many Muslim women 
wear veils, it is a commonly held belief in French society that women wear 
veils to publicly identify themselves as Muslim, and to send a religious 
message amounting to proselytism.21  Under the French interpretation of 
secularism known as laicite, an aspect of French culture that will later be 
discussed in detail, this type of public message is not permitted.22  
Furthermore, many French citizens are simply put off by what they see as a 
public and ostentatious display of difference that many types of hijab often 
inflict.23 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES:  ISLAM, THE 
STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 155 (2007) (“By early 2002, many French journalists, 
intellectuals, and officials increasingly linked the problem of scarves in schools with three 
other problems in society:  communalism, Islamism and sexism.”).  “Many in France 
became deeply worried and frightened about these problems, and therefore about the social 
effects of the voile.”  Id. 
 18. See Eleanor Beardsley, France's Burqa Ban Adds to Anti-Muslim Climate, NPR, 
Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/04/11/135305409/frances-burqa-ban-adds-to-anti-
muslim-climate (discussing the French sentiment that the burqa isolates and separates 
Muslim women from society) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 19. BOWEN, supra note 17, at 182. 
 20. See id. at 182 (“Public signs of Islam must be pushed back into the private sphere, 
in order to ‘send a message,’ as legislators often said in the February 2004 debates, that the 
Republic values its laicite.”). 
 21. See id. at 193 (noting that those in opposition to the banning of veils in public 
schools disapproved of the government's assumption that women veil themselves to send a 
message to others, rather than as part of their faithful observance of their religion). 
 22. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social Republic.”).  The Constitution continues: 
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion.  It shall respect all beliefs.  It shall be organised on a 
decentralised basis. 
Id. 
 23. See BOWEN, supra note 17, at 211–12 (quoting an excerpt from a conversation 
with a French woman who feels that women wearing the hijab in public are aggressors:  “It 
was that they were throwing their difference right at me, that they had these principles, and 
THE INTERSECTION OF LAICITE AND AMERICAN SECULARLISM 141 
The French perception of the veil goes beyond the concern with public 
religious affiliation and political movements.  Much of the animosity 
against the hijab in France stems from the French interest in upholding the 
dignity and equality of all citizens, including women.24  Those supporting 
the 2004 ban on headscarves in state schools identified three gender related 
problems the veil caused:  “school girls were pressured by men and boys to 
wear the voile; the voile intrinsically attacked the dignity and the equal 
status of women; and, because it did so, it encouraged violence against 
women living in the poor suburbs.”25  In a society in which the high 
population of poor, frustrated young Muslims is seen to result in the 
radicalization of Islam,26 the veil is perceived as the most public and 
tangible symbol of a dangerous movement threatening republicanism.27 
C.  Perceptions of the Veil in the United States 
Although American society does not ail from the same widespread and 
often systemic conflict between the Muslim community and the general 
population that marks France, prejudice and animosity towards Muslims 
still exists, especially towards those who publicly display their faith by 
donning religious garments such as the hijab.28  Like in many other 
countries with a sizeable Muslim community, “many Diaspora Muslims 
have difficulty harmonizing their belonging to a religious (and often 
visible) minority with their citizenship in countries that harbor residual 
colonial ideas even while they try to make sense of the rise of political 
Islam in the Muslim world.”29  After the September 11th attacks, tension 
surrounding Islamic veils has increased in America because they are often 
seen as symbols of violence against the West and of discrimination against 
                                                                                                                 
were making me notice them”). 
 24. See id. at 208 (“The sexism argument strongly appealed to French principles and 
emotions concerning the equality and dignity of women.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Custos, supra note 1, at 398 (“The working-class extraction or unemployed 
status coupled with the socio-cultural ghettoization and the experience of racism by many 
Muslims in France offers an ideal breeding ground for [destabilization of secularism] . . . .”). 
 27. See id. (“In such a context, the wearing of the Islamic veil . . . [is] interpreted not 
so much in light of its religious dimension as in light of its political significance.”). 
 28. See id. at 121 (discussing prejudices in American society against women who wear 
veils). 
 29. THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA xv (Sajida Sultana Alvi, Homa Hoodfar & 
Sheila McDonough eds., Women’s Press 2003). 
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women.30  As the United States does not adhere to France’s strict 
interpretation of secularism, it is not considered offensive to wear symbols 
of one’s religion in public.31 
II.  Relevant Constitutional Provisions 
A.  The Constitutions of the United States and France 
Both the United States and the French constitutions contain provisions 
protecting the freedom of religion and upholding the secular nature of the 
state:  Article VI of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the freedom to hold 
public office without regard to religious affiliation;32 Article 6 of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims that all citizens are eligible to 
participate in the representative government.33  Both U.S. and French legal 
traditions also emphasize the absence of a state religion.34  The Free 
Exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution mirrors the First Article of the 
French Constitution, which requires the state to respect all religious 
beliefs.35  Applying the texts of the constitutions of France and of the 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See id. (“Non-Muslim Americans in general . . . are often quick to judge Muslim 
women who wear the head scarf . . . as oppressed, in need of liberation and 
empowerment . . . . ”).  “Thus, the hijab is, more and more, being associated with violence 
and intolerance.”  Id. 
 31. See Thomas S. Kidd, Religious Freedom Under Assault, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 21, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-08-21-religion-freedom- 
persecution_n.htm (discussing the value of America’s various religious freedoms and alleged 
threats to those freedoms) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 33. See THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN § 6 (Fr. 1789) (“All citizens, being 
equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions 
and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their 
virtues and talents.”). 
 34. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”); see also Law of Dec. 9, 1905, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205 (declaring 
the absence of an official state religion in France and the separation of Church and State). 
 35. See U.S. CONST amend. I (establishing that Congress may not prohibit the free 
exercise of religion);  see also 1958 CONST. art. I (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, 
secular, democratic and social Republic.”).  The French Constitution continues: 
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion.  It shall respect all beliefs. 
Id. 
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United States to the French ban, it appears that neither document, on its 
face, would permit the state to ban a practice so closely connected to the 
faithful exercise of certain religions. 
B.  Laicite and the French Constitution 
Although, among Western nations, the United States and France are 
the only secular republics, the French interpretation of secularism differs 
greatly from the American interpretation due to the principle of laicite.36  
This principle renders otherwise comparable provisions of the United States 
and French constitutions divergent.37  Laicite is embedded in Article I of the 
French Constitution; the concept emphasizes that religion is a strictly 
private matter not to enter the public or political sphere.38  While, in the 
American view, adherence to laicite may seem to counter the free exercise 
of religion, France believes that it actually protects freedom of religion.39  
When religion does enter the public realm, it is secondary to legal, secular 
norms, and the State may restrict the public exercise of religion if the action 
contradicts State law.40  Due to this hierarchy, the French government may 
legally prevent public employees, such as teachers in State schools, from 
wearing religious garb to work or from praying conspicuously during the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Custos, supra note 1, at 339 (“[T]he United States and France are said to be 
the only true secular republics.”). 
 37. See id. at 340 (stating that, although the French and U.S. constitutions appear to 
provide the same protections for religious freedom, the French concept of laicite causes the 
French provisions to be interpreted differently). 
 38. 1958 CONST art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social Republic.”).  The Constitution continues: 
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.  It shall be organised on a 
decentralised basis. 
Id. 
 39. See John L. Allen, Benedict Makes a Case for ‘Healthy Secularism’, Nat’l Cath. 
Rep., Sept. 12, 2008, http://ncronline.org/node/1798 (“[I]t is fundamental . . . to insist upon 
the distinction between the political realm and that of religion in order to preserve both the 
religious freedom of citizens and the responsibility of the state toward them. . . .”) (quoting 
Pope Benedict XVI) (last visited December 19, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 40. See Custos, supra note 1, at 341 (“[T]he protection of religious norms must yield 
to the legal norms because of the hierarchy between the State and religions’ respective 
normative orders . . . .”). “Because State order supersedes religious order, the State may 
restrict the expression of the religious order whenever it runs counter to State rules.” Id. 
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workday.41  Prior to the ban on head coverings, the French government 
banned the conspicuous display of religious signs in public schools.42  Like 
the statute in question, the 2004 ban was enacted in defense of laicite.43  
The State emphasized that the ban, like the concept of laicite, was not 
meant to trample on religious freedom, but to uphold it.44  Unlike under 
U.S. law and jurisprudence, any form of religious expression that threatens 
laicite may be regulated or banned by the State under French law.45 
III.  Applicable United States Case Law and Statutes 
A.  Early Free Exercise Decisions 
United States case law in the area of religious freedom in the public 
sphere is both extensive and evolving.  The Supreme Court considered this 
issue in 1961 with Braunfeld v. Brown,46 a case involving a Pennsylvania 
law requiring that all businesses close on Sundays.47  Petitioners were 
Orthodox Jewish merchants alleging that the Sunday closing requirement 
impaired the group’s ability to earn a livelihood because they observed the 
Friday Sabbath.48  Whereas non-Orthodox Jews were able to work six days 
a week, while observing the Sabbath on Sunday, Orthodox Jews could only 
work five days a week in order to keep the Sabbath and obey the state 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See id. at 342 (discussing religious restrictions placed on State employees and on 
students in State schools). 
 42. See Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5109 (prohibiting the 
wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, including overly large crosses 
and veils). 
 43. See Custos, supra note 1, at 343 (“[T]he new law is meant to be an act of defense 
of French secularism, or laicite, for this fundamental principle was deemed to be under 
attack.”).  “It was argued that, given the central place of laicite in the French politico-legal 
system, the protean contest which had developed, threatened one of the bases of the social 
fabric and had to be neutralized.”  Id. 
 44. See id. at 360 (linking the prohibition of wearing conspicuous religious symbols in 
public schools with ensuring equal opportunity and ending societal discrimination). 
 45. See id. at 363 (“[A] hierarchy was established that ranked laicite as supreme 
whenever it was threatened by certain forms of religious expression.”). 
 46. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (finding that Pennsylvania’s 
Sunday closing law did not violate the Free Exercise rights of members of the Orthodox 
Jewish faith). 
 47. See id. at 601 (describing the statute at issue in the case). 
 48. See id. (introducing appellants as Orthodox Jews who were unable to work on 
Sundays). 
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statute.49  The statute, in effect, forced petitioners to give up a “basic tenet 
of the Orthodox Jewish faith” or be rendered unable to continue in their 
trade.50  The Court acknowledged that the government could not restrict 
religious exercise in any way, but that the freedom to act, “even when the 
action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from 
legislative restrictions.”51  The Court relied on an earlier case, Reynolds v. 
United States,52 in which the Court upheld the polygamy conviction of a 
member of the Mormon Church, even though the man’s religion 
commanded him to engage in polygamy.53  This case is distinguished from 
the veil ban because polygamy had a longstanding status as a criminal 
offense in the United States before the accused challenged the law.54  The 
Court determined that allowing citizens to avoid criminal liability due to 
religious belief would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.  Government could exist only in name under 
such circumstances.”55  Reynolds also made no distinction between 
religious beliefs and personal beliefs based on non-religious motivations.56  
This case established the rule that, if a religious practice conflicts with the 
public interest, the government may constitutionally proscribe the activity.57  
The Court construed the public interest fairly broadly, determining that 
because marriage is a cornerstone of Western civilization, the government 
may “determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social 
life under its dominion.”58  This interpretation of public interest leaves open 
to government regulation any religious practice that conflicts with a value 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See id. (“. . . Sunday closing will result in impairing the ability of all appellants to 
earn a livelihood . . . .”). 
 50. Id. at 601–02. 
 51. Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
 52. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (finding that religious duty is 
not a defense to a criminal indictment). 
 53. See id. at 168 (finding that religious duty is not a defense to a criminal indictment). 
 54. See id. at 161–65 (discussing the history of polygamy in the United States and in 
other nations). 
 55. Id. at 167. 
 56. See id. (“It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion:  it was 
still belief, and belief only.”). 
 57. Id. at 165–66 (finding that marriage is a cornerstone of society that deeply affects 
the public interest). 
 58. Id. at 166. 
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that goes to the foundation of American society.  This rule would be refined 
and narrowed in subsequent free exercise cases.59 
In holding that Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law did not violate the 
free exercise of the Orthodox Jewish faith, the Braunfeld Court generated 
the principle that a generally applicable rule aimed at restricting a secular 
activity is not per se unconstitutional simply because it produces an 
incidental effect on certain religious groups.  Due to the immense religious 
diversity of the United States, to hold such legislation as per se 
unconstitutional due to the incidental adverse effect on a certain group 
would unreasonably restrict the legislature.60  Justice Brennan’s reasoning 
in his concurring and dissenting opinion is especially applicable to the 
French ban on head coverings.  Brennan’s analysis focused on the 
protection of individual liberty, as opposed to the collective goals and 
public interest of the community at large.61  Brennan also focused on the 
fact that the effect of the law was that no one could be an Orthodox Jew and 
be competitive in a market that included those who observed the Sunday 
Sabbath.62  Perhaps most importantly, Brennan pointed out that the Court 
failed to evaluate the level of the state’s interest.63  While having the entire 
community rest on the same day is convenient, it does not reach the level of 
a compelling state interest.64 
Following Braunfeld in Free Exercise jurisprudence is Sherbet v. 
Verner,65 a case involving a similar set of facts as Braunfeld.  A South 
Carolina statute denied appellant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, unemployment 
benefits due to her inability to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her 
faith.66  The Court reiterated the Braunfeld dicta that the Free Exercise 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing modern case law on point). 
 60. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605–07 (stating that the legislature cannot be expected 
to refrain from enacting laws that have incidental effects on the unique practices of certain 
religious groups). 
 61. See id. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I would approach this 
case differently . . . [and] look primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather 
than towards the fulfillment of collective goals.”). 
 62. See id. at 613 (“Their effect is that no one may at one and the same time be an 
Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sunday-observing fellow tradesmen.”). 
 63. See id. at 614 (arguing that the state interest is “the mere convenience of having 
everyone rest on the same day”). 
 64. See id. (comparing the asserted state interest in having all citizens rest 
simultaneously to the genuine interest in protecting marriage or protecting children). 
 65. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that South Carolina’s denial 
of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist violated the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment). 
 66. See id. at 399–400 (describing the appellant and the issue before the Court). 
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Clause prohibits the government from regulating religious beliefs, but again 
acknowledged that in instances in which such regulations are upheld, “the 
conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial 
threat to public safety, peace, or order.”67  The Court laid out the test, 
followed in subsequent cases, that in order for a regulation to pass muster, it 
must either impose no unconstitutional burden on the freedom of religion, 
or there must be a compelling state interest in regulating the area that 
overrides any affect on Free Exercise.68  The Court went on to apply 
Braunfeld’s test of general applicability, determining that, although the 
statute was generally applicable, the appellant’s ineligibility derived solely 
from her religious beliefs.69  This is a test that would be clarified in 
subsequent Supreme Court cases.70  In effect, the statute forced the 
appellant to either follow her religion and not receive vital unemployment 
benefits, or abandon a central tenet of her faith and accept work.71  This was 
a choice that the Court believed to be fundamentally unacceptable in light 
of the Constitution.  Conditioning the availability of benefits on one’s 
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively 
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties and can only be 
justified by a compelling state interest.72  It is important to note that the 
Sherbet Court clarified Justice Brennan’s emphasis on evaluating the 
compelling state interest in his concurring and dissenting opinion in 
Braunfeld.73  Taking into consideration the State’s asserted interest in 
preventing fraudulent claims for unemployment benefits, the Court 
determined that mere convenience does not rise to the level of a compelling 
state interest, and South Carolina’s interest therefore did not override the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See id. at 403 (pointing out the actions evaluated under Braunfeld have posed a 
threat to public order). 
 68. See id. (discussing the requirements that South Carolina’s statute must meet in 
order to withstand a constitutional challenge). 
 69. See id. at 404 (“[A]ppellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from 
the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is 
unmistakable.”). 
 70. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores and 
Employment Division v. Smith). 
 71. See Sherbet, 374 U.S. at 404 (1963) (“The ruling forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”). 
 72. See id. at 406 (“Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this 
appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively 
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”). 
 73. See id. at 407 (assessing the legitimacy of the asserted state interest). 
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appellant’s right to free exercise of religion.74  From this decision emerged 
what would come to be known as the Sherbet test:  the first prong asks 
whether the state’s actions substantially burden a religious practice; if it 
does, the second prong asks whether the burden is justified by a compelling 
government interest.75  Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion is especially 
relevant to the regulation at issue in this Note.  Justice Douglas points out 
that the United States is a religiously diverse nation, and that many of these 
religions, such as Islam, require followers to adhere to practices that differ 
from those of the majority of society; these practices are “protected by the 
First Amendment but could easily be trod upon under the guise of ‘police’ 
or ‘health’ regulations reflecting the majority’s views.”76 
B.  Modern Applications of Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
Following Braunfeld and Sherbet, the Court was confronted with 
several cases that challenged the applicability of the Sherbet test.  
Employment Division v. Smith77 involved a state statute that imposed 
criminal sanctions for the ceremonial use of peyote.78  Respondents were 
members of the Native American Church who were fired from their jobs for 
the religious use of peyote and, as a consequence, denied unemployment 
benefits because the state criminalized peyote use.79  Respondents urged 
that the proper standard of review was the Sherbet test, asking whether 
there was a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if so, whether 
there was a compelling government interest justifying that burden.80  As a 
threshold matter, the Court declined to apply the Sherbet standard of 
review, determining that Sherbet is limited to unemployment cases.81  
                                                                                                                 
 74. See id. (finding that the asserted state interest does not reach a compelling level). 
 75. See id. at 403–06 (outlining and discussing the two prongs). 
 76. Id. at 411 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 77. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (deciding that the state may 
prohibit peyote use, and therefore may also deny unemployment benefits to those convicted 
of peyote use under the state statute). 
 78. See id. at 874–75 (summarizing the facts and posture of the case). 
 79. See id. (explaining the events that led to respondents being denied unemployment 
benefits). 
 80. See id. at 882–83 (“Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally 
applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, 
at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set 
forth in Sherbet v. Verner . . . .”). 
 81. See id. at 883–84 (declining to apply the Sherbet balancing test outside the scope 
of unemployment compensation). 
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Although Smith does involve a claim for unemployment benefits, the issue 
before the Court was limited to whether the state could constitutionally 
prohibit the religious use of peyote, rendering the Sherbet test 
inapplicable.82  This case is also distinguished from the Sherbet line of 
cases because the conduct at issue in the unemployment cases was not 
illegal, unlike the use of peyote.83  The Court reasoned that application of 
the Sherbet test in this case would result in a constitutional anomaly:  It 
would allow citizens to claim religious conviction to avoid following 
properly promulgated laws, making “‘professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.’”84  The Court also declined to require a 
compelling state interest, determining that that particular requirement 
should be limited to upholding equality of treatment (equal protection 
cases) and free speech, and it should not be used to create a private right to 
be immune from generally applicable laws.85  The Court appeared to 
address Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion from Sherbet, but comes to 
the opposite conclusion that religious scruples, such as the obligation to use 
peyote, do not relieve one of the duty to obey generally applicable laws.86  
Furthermore, because this case did not implicate other constitutional rights, 
such as the right to raise children according to one’s own beliefs, the Court 
determined that it was not a hybrid case and should not receive strict 
scrutiny.87  Instead, the Court subjected the statute to a far more lenient 
review, asking only whether the burden on exercise of religion was merely 
an incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid law.  If so, 
the First Amendment would not be implicated.88 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See id. at 876 (limiting the Court’s inquiry to whether Oregon may constitutionally 
prohibit the use of peyote). 
 83. See id. at 877–78 (emphasizing the significance of the legality of the conduct at 
issue in assessing the applicability of the Sherbet test). 
 84. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). 
 85. See id. at 885–86 (drawing a distinction between the types of situations requiring a 
compelling state interest and the situation in Smith). 
 86. See id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State 
is free to regulate.”). 
 87. See id. at 881–82 (listing precedent involving hybrid situations and indicating that 
Smith does not trigger other constitutional rights). 
 88. See id. at 878 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion is . . . merely the incidental 
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not 
been offended.”). 
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In direct response to the Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).89  The RFRA 
restored the compelling interest test used in Sherbet, prohibited the 
government from interfering with the free exercise of religion, even if the 
government action is of general applicability, without demonstrating a 
compelling state interest, and made the legislation applicable to all federal 
and state laws.90  This legislation restored the compelling interest test and 
required courts to analyze Free Exercise claims under strict scrutiny. 
The Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores91 reflected its reaction 
to the RFRA.  Flores involved a challenge under the RFRA to a zoning 
ordinance as applied to a church.92  To express dissatisfaction with RFRA, 
the Court did not consider the merits of the case, but determined that the 
threshold issue was the constitutionality of the RFRA itself.93  In passing 
RFRA, Congress relied on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows 
Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the substantive 
provisions of the Amendment.94  While the government argued that 
Congress’ power under § 5 is not limited to remedial or preventative 
legislation, the Court reasoned that the power is limited to enforcing the 
substantive measures of the amendment.95  Allowing Congress to enact 
such legislation would upset the balance of the separation of powers, as 
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the 
right is”; it is the Court’s duty to determine whether a constitutional 
violation has occurred.96  The Court formulated a test for determining the 
validity of enforcement legislation:  In order to pass muster, the legislation 
must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (1993) (restoring the 
application of strict scrutiny to any action burdening the free exercise of religion). 
 90. See id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (requiring a compelling state interest to interfere in the 
free exercise of religion). 
 91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (finding that RFRA was not 
appropriate enforcement action under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
contradicted the doctrine of separation of powers). 
 92. See id. at 511–12 (introducing the facts and posture of the case). 
 93. See id. at 511 (limiting the Court’s inquiry to the constitutionality of the RFRA). 
 94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to enact proper 
legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment). 
 95. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 518–19 (finding that Congress’ power under the 
enforcement clause is limited to enforcing the substantive provisions of the amendment). 
 96. See id. at 519 (stating that Congress may not enact enforcement legislation that 
changes the substance of the right itself). 
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remedied.97  Applying this rule to the facts in Flores, the Court considered 
the legislative history behind the rule and whether there had been a history 
of unconstitutional religious discrimination.98  In deciding whether the 
statute was proportionate to a legitimate end, the Court looked for a 
termination date and mechanism, and limitations on the statute’s 
implementation.99  After making these inquiries, the Court determined that 
because RFRA was not proportional or responsive to an unconstitutional 
behavior, it was not appropriate legislation under § 5.100
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah101 is 
particularly applicable in this case because the Court dealt with an 
ordinance that seemed to target a specific religious group, just as the 
headscarf ban targets Muslims.102  This case also relied and expanded upon 
the Smith line of analysis.103  The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye involved 
the Santeria religion and an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice under 
certain circumstances.104  A vital part of Santeria is the practice of animal 
sacrifice.105  When a Santeria Church leased land in the city of Hialeah with 
the intention of building a museum and a cultural center, the community 
became alarmed and held an emergency council meeting.106  This meeting 
resulted in several ordinances prohibiting religious practices adverse to the 
public morality, peace, and safety, including the unnecessary slaughter of 
animals.107  The ordinances were drafted such that few sacrifices and 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See id. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”). 
 98. See id. at 530 (determining that the legislative history lacked any evidence of 
generally applicable laws being passed to prevent unconstitutional religious discrimination). 
 99. See id. at 532–33 (finding that the RFRA lacked proportionality). 
 100. See id. at 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal balance.”). 
 101. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 
(1993) (determining that the city's ordinance was unconstitutional because it was 
discriminatory and the city lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on the Santeria 
religion). 
 102. See id. at 538 (finding that the ordinance inappropriately targeted the Santeria 
religion). 
 103. See id. at 531–32 (applying the Smith requirements). 
 104. See id. at 524–30 (summarizing the facts and posture of the case). 
 105. See id. at 524–25 (explaining the role of animal sacrifice in the Santeria religion). 
 106. See id. at 526 (describing the events leading up to the creation of the ordinance). 
 107. See id. (indicating that the ordinance addressed practices believed to be adverse to 
public welfare, including the unnecessary slaughter of animals). 
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killings were prohibited except for those by the Santeria church.108  
Following the Smith framework, the Court first determined whether the 
series of ordinances were facially neutral by first looking at the text; a rule 
lacks facial neutrality “if it refers to a religious practice without a secular 
meaning discernible from the language or context.”109  After determining 
that the ordinances were facially neutral, the Court noted that facial 
neutrality on its own is not conclusive, as the “Free Exercise Clause 
protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as 
overt.”110  The Court then looked at the object of the ordinance and its 
effect.111  Because the operation of the ordinances exclusively burdened the 
Santeria religion, the ordinances were collectively discriminatory in 
application.112  The Court then considered the ordinances’ general 
applicability, noting that neutrality and general applicability were closely 
related; absence of one is strong evidence of the absence of the other.113  
Because the ordinances were broad, prohibiting animal sacrifice even when 
it does not affect public health and safety, and because nondiscriminatory 
alternatives would have achieved the alleged government interest, the Court 
determined that the ordinances were clearly not generally applicable.114  
The Court also noted that an Equal Protection type of analysis would be 
useful in determining the neutrality of the ordinances.115  Although the 
failure of the ordinances to meet neutrality and general applicability ends 
the analysis, the Court did mention that, had that not been the case, the 
alleged government interest would not have justified the burden on 
Santeria.116  The ends were under-inclusive and clearly not narrowly 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See id. at 535–36 (allowing an exception for numerous types of slaughter, 
including kosher slaughter under the Jewish faith). 
 109. Id. at 533. 
 110. Id. at 534. 
 111. See id. at 535 (“Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is 
strong evidence of its object.”). 
 112. See id. at 535–38 (finding that the ordinances exclusively burden the Santeria 
religion, negating any genuine government interest in preventing the slaughter of animals). 
 113. See id. at 542–43 (analyzing whether the ordinances are generally applicable as 
required by Smith) 
 114. See id. at 543 (“Despite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to 
animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by 
religious sacrifice.”).  “Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are 
either not prohibited or approved by express provision.”  Id. 
 115. See id. at 540 (suggesting that the Court may look at legislative history, as in an 
equal protection analysis, to determine the neutrality of the ordinances). 
 116. See id. at 546 (“[E]ven were the governmental interests compelling, the ordinances 
are not drawn in narrow terms to accomplish those interests.”). 
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tailored; “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest 
order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital 
interest unprohibited.”117 
IV.  Application of United States Law to a Potential Ban on Head 
Coverings 
A.   Application of Case Law 
It is unlikely that a ban similar to the French veil ban would survive a 
challenge under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
The compelling state interests of ensuring public safety and upholding 
secularism asserted in the French case would not outweigh the burden 
imposed on the free exercise of religion under any modern American 
jurisprudence.118  Case law in the area of the free exercise of religion has 
established that: 
[T]he general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular  
religious practice . . . .  A law failing to satisfy these requirements must 
be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.119 
Part III of this Note introduced Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye as a 
landmark case in freedom of religion jurisprudence.120  Because the 
ordinances were found to clearly target a specific religious group, Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye is an apt case to apply to a potential ban of head 
coverings.121  Application of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye analysis 
begins with an examination of the legislation’s neutrality.122  Facial 
neutrality can be ascertained by simply looking to the legislation’s text; “[a] 
law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 547 (citations omitted). 
 118. See discussion infra Part IV.A (weighing the French government’s asserted 
interest in enacting the statute against the burden imposed on the free exercise of religion). 
 119. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531–32 (1993) (citing 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 120. See discussion supra Part III.B (summarizing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye in 
relation to the French statute at issue). 
 121. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.,  508 U.S. at 535 (showing that the 
ordinance specifically targeted Santeria sacrifice). 
 122. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the first step in the Court’s analysis). 
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meaning discernible from the language or context.”123  Article 1 of the Law 
Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public Spaces forbids all 
citizens from wearing clothing in public spaces that conceals the face.124  
Article 2 states that the ban does not apply to veils otherwise permitted by 
law or to veils worn for health or professional reasons, or to veils worn as 
part of a sporting event or an artistic or traditional festival.125  The 
remaining substantive portions of the regulation, Articles 3 and 4, impose a 
fine of over $40,000 on those who, through violence or abuse of power, 
force a woman to wear a face-covering veil.126  Following Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye’s analysis, it must be concluded that the French ban is 
facially neutral under U.S. jurisprudence.  There is no reference to Islam, 
the hijab or any other type of Islamic head covering.127  While Article 4 
could be interpreted to target Muslim families that require female members 
to veil themselves, the law takes a secular approach to this circumstance.128  
Therefore, while the text of the law is “consistent with the claim of facial 
discrimination . . . the argument is not conclusive.”129  It should be noted 
that, although the majority in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was 
focused mainly on the facial neutrality of the legislation, Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion discusses the possibility of examining substantive 
neutrality as well.130  Souter concedes that substantive neutrality was not at 
issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, as the ordinance clearly lacked 
facial neutrality.131  The majority also acknowledges that legislation 
targeting “religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by 
mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”132  This is an 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 533. 
 124. Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344. 
 125. See id. (providing exceptions for face covering veils otherwise permitted by law, 
veils worn for health reasons, sporting events, and traditional festivals). 
 126. See id. (imposing different levels of sanctions for violating the ban). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. (applying Article 4 generally, with no reference to Muslims or Islam). 
 129. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 534. 
 130. See id. at 561–62 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[O]ur common notion of neutrality is 
broad enough to cover not merely what might be called formal neutrality . . . but also what 
might be called substantive neutrality, which . . . would generally require government to 
accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral 
laws.”). 
 131. See id. at 563 (“That proposition is not at issue in this case, however, for Hialeah’s 
animal-sacrifice ordinances are not neutral under any definition, any more than they are 
generally applicable.”). 
 132.  Id. at 534. 
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important distinction in the headscarf case, as the legislation appears neutral 
on its face.133  However, an examination of the legislation’s effect indicates 
that it is not substantively neutral.  While the text bans clothing disguising 
the face in public spaces in general, it effectively curtails the rights of 
Muslims.134  This is because neither Christianity nor Judaism requires 
followers to cover their faces.135  Therefore, the law would produce a 
disparate impact by constricting the ability of Muslims to practice their 
religion, while having little or no effect on followers of other widely 
practiced religions. 
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Court then examined the 
general applicability of the ordinance.136  Assuming that the government 
interest in the hypothetical American legislation mirrors that of the French 
government, national security and the protection of secularism, the 
headscarf ban is under-inclusive and therefore lacks general applicability.  
As to national security, the ban is under-inclusive because it provides 
exceptions to almost all circumstances in which a veil would be worn, 
excluding a veil worn for religious purposes.137  If the government truly 
wanted to further the interest of national security through this legislation, it 
would not have provided exceptions for sporting events and festivals.  The 
legislation is also under-inclusive with regard to the government’s interest 
in promoting secularism.  The legislation does not apply to garments worn 
by nuns, priests, or other religious figures in public places, but only to those 
garments that would cover the face.138  Secularism is no more threatened by 
the donning of headscarves in public places than it is by religious figures 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing the neutrality of the French 
legislation). 
 134. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344 (providing exceptions 
for most other types of face covering veils worn in modern French society). 
 135. See Custos, supra note 1, at 381 (distinguishing between contemporary Muslim 
interpretations that instruct female Muslims to cover their faces and contemporary 
Christianity’s lack of such a requirement). 
 136. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 542 (1993) (“We turn next 
to a second requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the rule that laws burdening religious 
practice must be of general applicability.” (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990))). 
 137. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344 (allowing veils to be 
worn for health reasons, sporting events, festivals, and all otherwise permissible purposes). 
 138. See id. (describing exceptions to the French law that prohibits face concealment in 
public). 
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wearing their official robes in public.  Due to its under-inclusive nature, the 
legislation cannot be said to satisfy the general applicability requirement.139 
Following Supreme Court jurisprudence, a law imposing a burden on 
the exercise of religion that is neither neutral nor of general applicability 
must undergo a strict scrutiny analysis.140  This standard requires that such a 
law advance compelling state interests and “be narrowly tailored in pursuit 
of those interests.”141  To determine whether a compelling state interest 
exists, we must look to whether the state attempted to enact measures to 
regulate other types of conduct threatening that interest.142  In this case, it 
has already been established that the government failed to regulate other 
types of religious conduct or non-religious conduct in furtherance of 
national security and the promotion of secular values.143  Therefore, the 
government cannot claim that a headscarf ban would further these interests.  
Due to the under-inclusive nature of the legislation, it is unlikely that a U.S. 
court would find that it is narrowly tailored.  There are other, more narrow, 
options to further the same interests without imposing such a burden on 
religion.  The government could implement plans that target violent and 
radical groups regardless of ideology, or programs that assist women who 
suffer from gender-related oppression regardless of the source.  As to the 
promotion of secularism, the government could require civics classes in 
schools that address the importance of the separation of Church and State.  
The veil ban is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, 
and would not survive a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause. 
B.  Application of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 
Because the hypothetical headscarf case involves a federal regulation, 
it is also subject to the RFRA.144  The RFRA restored the compelling 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 542 (concluding that 
under inclusion that is substantial does not advance a legitimate government interest and 
fails the test of general applicability). 
 140. See id. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of 
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. at 546–47 (stating the test for determining whether a compelling state 
interest exists). 
 143. See discussion supra Part IV.A (showing that the ban does not mention religious 
conduct other than covering one’s face and does not seek to regulate non-religious conduct 
to promote national security or secularism). 
 144. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (holding that RFRA is 
invalid only as it applies to local and state regulation). 
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interest test set forth in Sherbet in all cases where the free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened.145  The key difference between 
application of the RFRA and application solely of Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye is that neutral laws substantially affecting the free exercise of 
religion are subject to strict scrutiny under the RFRA.146  Under this 
analysis, the fact finder must first ask whether the regulation “imposes any 
burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.”147  In this case, the 
face-covering ban clearly places a substantial burden on the free exercise of 
Islam for those who believe they must cover their faces as part of their 
religion.  The hypothetical appellant’s penalty is derived solely from her 
choice to cover her face in the practice of her religion, and there is 
enormous pressure upon her to abandon this aspect of her faith.148  She is 
forced to choose between faithfully practicing her religion and continuing 
to pay large punitive fines.  Under the Sherbet analysis, we must then ask 
whether a compelling government interest justifies the burden on 
appellant’s practice of her religion.149  While national security and the 
separation of Church and State are compelling interests, the government 
must show that there are no alternatives that could further these interests 
without infringing on the appellant’s First Amendment rights.150  As 
discussed above, there are alternative possibilities that could further these 
interests without burdening the free exercise of religion.  Applying the 
Sherbet test, the hypothetical headscarf ban would not survive a First 
Amendment challenge under the RFRA. 
V.  Possible Challenge to European Union Judicial Bodies 
This Note will now return to the veil ban’s operation in France and 
explore the potential outcomes to a suit challenging the ban’s 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2010) (restoring 
the Sherbet test for all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened). 
 146. See id. (subjecting all laws to strict scrutiny, regardless of the neutrality of the 
legislation). 
 147. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 148. See id. at 404 (pointing out that the regulation created an “unmistakable” pressure 
upon the appellant to give up an important religious practice). 
 149. See id. at 406 (turning to the question of whether a compelling state interest 
justified the substantial infringement of the appellant’s right to the free exercise of religion). 
 150. See id. at 407 (noting that—to show a compelling interest—the state would be 
required to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation address the same issue 
without also infringing on the free exercise of religion). 
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constitutionality.  Because the French Constitutional Council has 
determined that the veil ban is constitutional, it is unlikely that a French 
litigant would be able to obtain favorable verdict in response to a challenge 
to the ban’s constitutionality.  However, were French petitioners to exhaust 
all judicial challenges within France, they would have two causes of action 
available at the supra-national level:  A challenge to the European Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg (ECJ) and a challenge to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg, France (ECHR).151 
A.  Challenge to the European Court of Justice 
A potential challenger to the French statute could bring her case to the 
ECJ on the grounds that the statute violates the principle of equality 
embedded in Article 10 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights or in the Race Discrimination directive.152  Article 10 provides for 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religions; the language implies that 
the European Union (E.U.) recognizes the general principle of equality.153  
The ECJ handles discrimination cases based on the principles that 
“comparable situations are not to be treated differently” and “different 
situations are not to be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively 
justified.”154  The French statute falls within the second of these two 
principles because of the difference between religions that require followers 
to cover their heads and religions that do not.155  Christianity does not 
require its adherents to cover their faces, so its practitioners are not forced 
to choose between following their religion and obeying the law.  This 
application of the law is reminiscent of Justice Douglas’s concurring 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Custos, supra note 1, at 377 (naming the ECJ and the ECHR as two possible 
forums for causes of action against legislation enacted by E.U. member states). 
 152. See id. at 379 (identifying Article 10 of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as the provision under which a claim could be brought before the ECJ). 
 153. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10 
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”).  The Charter 
continues: 
This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others in public or in private, to manifest religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
Id. 
 154. Custos, supra note 1, at 380. 
 155. See id. at 381 (“To the extent that the new legislative provision applies the same 
rule, namely the ban on conspicuous signs to different categories of subjects, it constitutes a 
uniform treatment of differently situated persons.”). 
THE INTERSECTION OF LAICITE AND AMERICAN SECULARLISM 159 
opinion in Sherbet v. Verner:  those with religious scruples that differ from 
the majority should not have to choose between remaining faithful to an 
important tenet of their religion and being loyal to the laws of their state.156  
This juxtaposition creates a situation in which differently situated persons 
are treated the same. Based on the ECJ’s previous decisions, this amounts 
to discrimination.157 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, a challenge under the 
E.U. Charter could be brought before the ECJ.158  While the E.U. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has been binding on E.U. member states since 2009, 
the E.U. Constitution also contains a broad adoption of the Aristotelian 
view of equality.159  However, the ECJ is unlikely to find in favor of a 
potential challenge to the French statute due to the Court’s interpretation of 
the E.U. Charter and the European Constitution in relation to the 
constitutions of member states.160  Article II-112 of the European 
Constitution gives significant deference to the traditions of member states 
when they conflict with the fundamental rights laid out in the constitution 
or in the E.U. Charter.161  Furthermore, Article II-112 also fully recognizes 
the legitimacy of national statutes and case law.162  Because the French 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[M]any 
people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society—beliefs that are protected by the 
First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of ‘police’ or ‘health’ 
regulations reflecting the majority’s views.”) (emphasis added). 
 157. See Custos, supra note 1, at 381 (“To the extent the new legislative provision 
applies the same rule . . . to different categories of subjects, it constitutes a uniform treatment 
of differently situated persons.”). 
 158. See Treaty of Lisbon:  Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community 2007 O.J. (C 306) 13 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF 
(recognizing the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union). 
 159. See id. (stating that the European Constitution’s approach to equality could be 
applicable to the French statute); see also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and 
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of 
law . . . .”). 
 160. See Custos, supra note 1, at 384 (“[T]he ECJ seems, in final analysis, unlikely to 
impose the Aristotelian conception of equality or to enforce equality rights of religious 
minorities in France.”). 
 161. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. II-112, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 
53 (“Insofar as this Charter recognizes fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in 
harmony with those traditions.”). 
 162. See id. at 54 (“Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices . . . .”).  
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statute is based on the uniquely French cultural notion of laicite, the ECJ is 
likely to give deference to this important member state tradition and to 
uphold the statute. 
While a challenge based on the E.U. Charter is unlikely to be 
successful, the Race Discrimination directive could provide adequate 
foundation upon which the ECJ could find in favor of the potential 
challenger.163  The directive’s purpose is to engrain the concept of equal 
treatment in all E.U. member states; equal treatment meaning that “there 
shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin.”164  The directive further imposes a standard of review more lenient 
than that used in U.S. courts, requiring that indirect discrimination through 
a facially neutral action be justified by a legitimate state interest and that 
the chosen means be appropriate.165  Indirect discrimination is at play in the 
French statute.  Though the statute is neutral on its face, in practice, it 
subjects those whose religion requires them to cover their head to unequal 
treatment by forcing them to choose between staying faithful to their beliefs 
or breaking the law.  The statute does not subject those without this 
particular religious scruple to this choice, and—in a modern context—
affects Muslims exclusively.  The ECJ would be faced with three issues in 
determining whether the directive applies to this case.  First, as a threshold 
matter, the court would have to determine whether Muslim face coverings 
implicate race or ethnicity as discussed in the directive.166  If the answer is 
no, the court would need to determine whether a discrimination case 
alleging indirect discrimination based on religion could be assimilated to 
discrimination based on race or ethnicity.167  This would not be an easy 
task.  As previously discussed, the hijab can indicate religious affiliation, 
cultural and ethnic affiliation, or both depending on the individual.168  
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Custos, supra note 1, at 384 (indicating that the Race Discrimination Directive 
could aid a potential challenger). 
 164. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (EC). 
 165. See id. at art. 2(2)(b) (“[I]ndirect discrimination shall . . . occur where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic 
origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless . . . objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.”). 
 166. See Custos, supra note 1, at 385 (presenting the threshold questions facing the 
ECJ.). 
 167. See id. (presenting the threshold questions facing the ECJ in order to determine 
that the statute is discriminatory in practice despite being facially neutral). 
 168. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing the various meanings the hijab can have 
for individuals). 
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Second, the court would have to determine whether the preservation of 
laicite is a legitimate aim and whether the banning of all head coverings is 
an appropriate means of achieving that aim.169  Because of the high level of 
deference afforded the traditional values of member states previously 
discussed, it is likely that this prong of the analysis would focus mostly on 
the suitability of the ban to preserving laicite.170  Third, and most critically, 
the court would need to make a policy judgment on how to resolve the 
divergence between the concept of equality inherent in the E.U. Charter and 
the French principle of laicite.171 
B.  Challenge to the European Court of Human Rights 
A potential challenger to the French headscarf ban could also bring a 
suit alleging that the statute violates freedom of religion or the principle of 
equality.172  Such a challenge would be brought under Article 9 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  This article guarantees the right to 
freedom of religion in public or in private, subjecting this freedom only to 
legal limitations necessary to protect democracy and public welfare.173  The 
ECHR has upheld the freedom to follow a particular faith and the freedom 
to practice one’s faith or absence of faith in the case law that has emerged 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See id. (presenting the second prong necessary for the ECJ to analyze). 
 170. See id. (identifying laicite as a likely focus for the ECJ in determining whether the 
government has demonstrated a legitimate aim for enacting the ban); see also discussion 
supra Part II.B (discussing the importance of laicite in French culture). 
 171. See Custos, supra note 1, at 385 (“The crucial question is whether the ECJ would 
choose to invoke its Aristotelian approach to equality and contradict a national universalist 
approach under the Race discrimination directive . . . .”). 
 172. See id. at 386 (identifying freedom and religion and the principle of equality as 
two possible grounds for a challenge before the ECHR). 
 173.  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (outlining the article’s clause on 
freedom on thought, conscience and religion). 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  2.  Freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 
protections of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
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in this area since the 1990s.174  The court has gone so far as to conclude that 
Article 9’s guarantee of “freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one 
of the foundations of a ‘democratic society.’”175  However, the ECHR has 
allowed freedom of religion to be restricted to protect the religious 
pluralism inherent in many European states.176  The ECHR imposes a 
significantly lower burden of proof on the state than the modern Supreme 
Court imposes in Free Exercise cases in the United States.177  Similar to the 
Sherbet balancing test, the ECHR requires that the statute in question 
satisfy a compelling government interest and that it be proportionally 
related to that interest.178  Were the court to determine that the genuine 
purpose of the statute is to protect the principle of laicite and that the 
banning of head-scarves in public serves this purpose, it is likely that the 
ECHR will uphold the ban on the grounds that secularism is at the very 
foundation of democratic societies in European states. 
A challenge to the ECHR on the grounds of the principle of equality 
would be very similar to such a challenge before the ECJ.  The challenge 
would be brought under Articles 14 and 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, which provide for the enjoyment of the freedoms of the 
convention without discrimination on numerous grounds, including 
religion.179  Again, so long as the court finds that the true purpose of the ban 
is to protect laicite, it is unlikely that the ECHR will strike down the statute 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1993) 
(upholding religious freedom of faith or absence of faith). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Custos, supra note 1, at 387 (explaining the considerations taken by the ECHR 
when evaluating religious equality and protection).  Custos further stated: 
Due consideration (by the ECHR) for the indissociable pluralism component 
of . . . democracy makes it possible for states in which several religions coexist 
to place restrictions on the manifestation of faith in order to reconcile the 
respective interests of the different religious groups and ensure protection of all 
religious beliefs. 
Id.  See also Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (upholding religious freedom of 
faith or absence of faith). 
 177. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the evolution of the standard of proof 
used by the Supreme Court in Free Exercise Clause cases). 
 178. See Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 36–50 (laying out the three-
prong test the ECHR uses in assessing the legitimacy of statutes that allegedly infringe in the 
free exercise of religion). 
 179. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 14, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (“The enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”). 
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because of the deference given to the traditions of member states in 
determining whether the state’s objective is a reasonable justification for 
the discrimination. 
The ECHR recently confronted this issue in Sahin v. Turkey.180  Ms. 
Sahin challenged a Turkish university policy banning Islamic scarves on the 
grounds that it violated her rights under several Convention articles, 
including her freedom to manifest her religion under Article 9.181  The court 
undertook a two-step analysis, first asking whether the State interfered in 
Ms. Sahin’s right to practice her religion, and second asking whether the 
interference was prescribed by law.182  After deciding that the prohibition 
amounted to interference, the court conceded to Turkish domestic law in 
deciding that so long as the prohibition had a basis in domestic law and was 
written with reasonable foreseeability, it was properly prescribed by law.183  
As this case is somewhat similar to a potential challenge to the French ban, 
a study of it adds to the certainty that the ECHR is likely to uphold the 
French ban. 
VI.  Recommendations 
The implementation of the veil ban in France has already received 
extensive criticism abroad.184  Because the French veil ban is based on 
upholding laicite, the French Constitutional Council should reevaluate the 
concept of laicite in the face of France’s changing demographics.  Laicite, 
though standing for the complete secularization of the French state, is 
nonetheless grounded in the Catholic tradition.185  The Constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 ¶ 115 (2005) 
(holding that a Turkish University’s ban on Islamic scarves was not a violation of the 
Convention). 
 181. See id. (holding that there was no violation of Ms. Sahin’s Article 9 rights). 
 182. See id. ¶ 75 (“The Court must consider whether the applicant’s right under 
Article 9 was interfered with and, if so, whether the interference was ‘prescribed by law’, 
pursued a legitimate aim and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ within the meaning at 
Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.”). 
 183. See id. ¶ 81 (determining that there was an interference, but that the interference 
was properly prescribed by Turkish law). 
 184. See Parliament Approves Ban on Full Veil in Public, FRANCE 24, Sept. 15, 2010, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100914-french-parliament-approves-ban-full-veil-public-
senate-law-fine-sarkozy-islam (indicating that international leaders, including President 
Obama, have condemned the implementation of the veil ban). 
 185. See Custos, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing Catholicism’s former status as the 
state religion in France, and its substantial role in shaping the concept of laicite). 
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Council’s narrow interpretation of laicite was more relevant and plausible 
when the largest distinction in French society was between Catholics and 
Protestants, and not between entirely different religious traditions.  As it 
stands, the government’s use of laicite constitutes a “failure to fully account 
for religious diversity.”186  By limiting how followers practice their faith, 
the French government is attempting to use religions that do not require 
apparent displays of affiliation, such as Christianity, to inform followers of 
other religions and to transform the religious landscape of the nation.187  In 
this case, the veil ban “implicitly relies upon one of the characteristics of 
Catholicism, namely, the normalcy of discrete sartorial signs of religious 
affiliation to proclaim a ban on conspicuous sartorial signs.”188  If the 
government’s goal is to integrate Muslims more fully into French society, it 
would be beneficial for lawmakers to redefine what secularism means in a 
multicultural state and to change the way laicite informs the political 
landscape of the nation.  Given the international concern that the veil ban 
has created, it is likely that the law, and the continued application of laicite 
as it stands, will alienate many Muslims who see the hijab as an integral 
part of their faith.  If the concept underlying the veil ban were broadened to 
allow voluntary expression of religious faith, the ban itself would no longer 
be seen as a constraint on the religious rights of the Muslim community. 
  It would be beneficial for the French government to preserve Article 
4 of the statute, which forbids forcing a woman to wear a veil in public.189  
Although this Note has primarily focused on Article 1, Article 4 is likely to 
be a source of tension among Muslims who believe their female relative 
should be veiled without regard to the woman’s personal convictions.  
Unlike Article 1, which forbids voluntary face covering, Article 4 does not 
infringe on the right to voluntarily practice one’s faith.190  If the true motive 
behind the ban is to protect the dignity of women who could potentially be 
forced to wear the veil against their will, Article 4 is more appropriately 
suited to a government interest than Article 1.  Upholding Article 4 of the 
statute would send the message that the French government intends to 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 397 (“[T]he majority religion is set up as a model which not only 
informs the drafting of the law but also serves as the reference for a process of 
uniformization of the manifestation of religious belief in the public sphere.”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344. 
 190. See id. (detailing the punishment for forcing another person to conceal his or her 
face in public). 
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uphold the dignity of women and is prepared to address a practice that is of 
serious concern to the Muslim community and to women worldwide.  This 
choice would also serve the purpose of integrating Muslims more fully into 
French society, since it does not require Muslim women to abandon what 
many feel is an important tenet of their faith; it instead allows women to 
choose how they manifest their faith. 
VII.  Conclusion 
While a ban on Islamic head coverings in the United States is not 
likely to pass muster at the Supreme Court level, it is clear that, in light of 
the principle of laicite, the ban will be upheld in France.  While it seems 
counterintuitive to those accustomed to the American sense of liberty that 
banning a religious symbol in public actually serves to protect the freedom 
of religion, this is just the purpose that laicite serves.  Even though the 
French ban technically does not violate the French Constitution or the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the French government has failed to 
address the disparate impact this ban will have on its citizens, particularly 
the female Muslim minority.  While the government argues that the ban 
will treat everyone equally, it is not acknowledging the fact that “the 
enjoyment of religious freedom by those faithful to [the Catholic] majority 
religion is de facto facilitated” while Muslims are forced to choose between 
their faith and their country.191  Laicite ensures that all religions are treated 
equally, and yet the principle itself is a product of the majority religion.192  
This requires growing communities of non-Christians to discard certain 
religious practices that are not customary in historically Christian societies.  
Many Muslims and non-Muslims alike agree that forcing a woman to wear 
the veil is a violation of her personal dignity.193  The French ban confronts 
this serious issue plaguing the Middle East and—increasingly—Western 
societies.  However, the French government has failed to account for the 
citizens who, in genuine religious conviction, choose on their own accord to 
wear the veil as a manifestation of Islam. 
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 192. See id. (“[T]he majority religion is set up as a model which not only informs the 
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